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 New Communication Markets: 





Private stakeholders and public policy makers in Europe, North America and Asia 
have come to regard the communication infrastructure - or the ‘information highway’ 
- as a major piece of a complex economic and political puzzle.  Once the puzzle is 
complete, they suggest, all the social and economic benefits of the information society 
will become available to citizens and businesses.  As the rhetoric would have it, the 
introduction of ever higher capacity communication networks will enable economies 
to prosper, the creation of new socially and economically productive employment 
opportunities, and the enhancement of the quality of life for a growing proportion of 
the world’s population.   
 
Electronic modes of communication have been experiencing very rapid innovation 
and developments in telecommunication, computing and software technologies are 
changing the way we interact in the world.  Audio, video and print information, 
converted into digital signals, and packaged as multimedia stand-alone or networked 
products, is capturing the imagination of technologists, futurists, educationalists and 
policy makers.  This paper focuses on the reconfiguration of policies and regulations 
which is proceeding alongside innovations in communication technologies and in the 
structure and organisation of communication markets.   
 
The paper raises three main questions:  1) Are the predominant characteristics of 
policy and regulation that are emerging in the 1990s adequate to ensure that the 
‘information highways’ will be accessible and that they will maximise the potential 
for participation in the information society of the twenty-first century?  2)  In the face 
of uncertainty and the limited resources of policy makers, where should available 
resources be focused?  3)  Will the twenty-first century see the withering away of 
regulation, or will it see a renewal of public policy and regulation in the ‘public 
interest?  These questions are addressed within the framework of a strategic 
evolutionary model of the new communication supply markets. 
 
2.0  Policies for a Knowledgeable Society 
 
The term ‘knowledgeable society’ was coined in 1966 to suggest that societies would 
come to be characterised predominantly by the collection, organisation and 
interpretation of their knowledge in a continuous effort to extract meaning applicable 
to the problems at hand (Lane 1966).  At least since the 1950s, scholars have been 
investigating whether the combined impact of innovations in the technical 
characteristics of the communication infrastructure and the ‘infostructure’ of 
advanced industrial societies are consistent with democratic participatory ideals or 
whether they are increasingly divisive and exclusionary.  Some have focused mainly 
on the organisation of the scientific knowledge creation enterprise (Bernal 1954); 
others on whether tacit knowledge is resistant to exchange via the sophisticated ‘bits’ 
and ‘bytes’ of digital communication (Polanyi 1962); and still others on the historical 
recurrence of monopolies or oligopolies of knowledge consistent with the structure 
    2and organisation of each new wave of innovation in the technologies of 
communication (Innis 1951). 
 
By the 1980s and 1990s, the lessons for social science inquiry into the implications of 
advanced communication technologies had become very clear.  If we are to penetrate 
the rhetoric and mystique of ‘the greatest technological juggernaut that ever rolled’ 
(Freeman and Soete 1994), it is necessary to couple analyses of the social and 
economic aspects of the ‘infrastructure of communication’ with those of the 
‘infostructure’, that is, the ways in which knowledge is produced and used.  Questions 
about the distribution of the production and use of all forms of knowledge - both 
scientific and that which informs our everyday lives - are inextricably linked to the 
configuration of the infrastructure of communication.  Questions about the technical 
characteristics of advanced communication technologies and markets are also 
simultaneously questions about the social, economic and political organisation of 
their development and use.  Gibbons et al. (1994) refer to the ‘new institutional 
landscape of knowledge production’.  It is institutions, whether they be firms, policy 
making organisations or regulatory bodies, that need to be at the heart of any 
consideration of the adequacy or inadequacy of polices and regulations in the new 
communication markets. 
 
The development of conceptual models which can be used to explore the structures 
and processes that are shaping the expansion of communication markets into a 
multitude of new service configurations calls for analysis in two important areas.
 
  The first is a focus on the technical designs and architectures of communication 
networks - what are the technical parameters of infrastructure controls, signals, and 
tolls?  The second is a focus on the design of policies and regulatory environments - 
what are social, economic and political parameters of communication controls, 
signals, and tolls?  These two areas can be integrated using a strategic evolutionary 
model of the development and diffusion of information and communication 
technologies.  This model can be used to suggest areas in which public policy and 
regulatory initiatives need to be concentrated to promote the social and economic 
objectives of maximising the potential for participation in the ‘knowledgeable’ 
society of the twenty-first century. 
 
3.0  A Strategic Evolutionary Model 
 
Regardless of whether the ‘information highways’ of the future are comprised of 
optical fibre networks or of a mix of optical fibre, coaxial cable, copper and radio-
based technologies, the fruits of technical innovation have brought the potential for 
vastly expanded capacity, the promise of flexibility and greater choice of services for 
users, as well as the potential for flourishing competition in the marketplace.  In the 
language of the economics of technical change, technologies and markets are co-
evolving (Nelson 1994).  Central to this evolutionary process is institutional change.  
Changes in institutions affect all aspects of the configuration of technologies and 
markets.  Analysis of the co-evolution of technologies and markets in the context of 
the ‘information highway’ calls for the application of a conceptual model that 
suggests: how suppliers and users will control the evolution of the information 
infrastructure; how consumers will signal their preferences for new services in the 
    3marketplace; and how political and economic incentives will govern the tolls (prices) 
of accessing and using these infrastructures.  
 
There are two alternative models that are implicitly or explicitly employed in the 
growing literature on the development of information infrastructure and they appear 
in both national and global contexts.  There is first a full competition model which 
envisages a transition to an unregulated ‘commodity’ market.  Second, there is a 
model that envisages that economic and political incentives remain in place to create 
conditions for the continuing monopolisation of markets, even in the face of technical 
change. 
 
3.1  The Full Competition Model and ‘Commodity’ Supply Environment 
 
The decade of the 1980s was characterised by the introduction of liberalised markets 
for telecommunication supply.  Competition in the supply of the components of the 
communication infrastructure continues to be positively sanctioned by the policies of 
governments in many countries.  There is little dispute about the theoretical impact of 
the competitive marketplace which the liberalisation of  markets is expected to 
encourage.  In theory, markets are expected to evolve to encourage the supply of 
multiple competing network and service operators and their networks are expected to 
be seamlessly ‘stitched’ together by transparent agreements among competitors 
(Calhoun 1992).  The traditional public telecommunication network operators are 
expected to compete and win business alongside cable and other fixed network 
operators and suppliers of radio-based infrastructure.  In practice, however, the 
uncertainty associated with the willingness of customers to pay for advanced 
communication services (including interactive ‘multimedia’ services) has meant that 
there is considerable reluctance on the part of many national policy makers and 
private sector companies to opt for policies and regulations that would lead to a 
market structure that even begins to approximate the conditions envisaged by the full 
competition model. 
 
State or privately owned public telecommunication operators historically have 
provided the vast majority of the national infrastructure facilities for the origination 
and termination of communication traffic.  The liberalisation of national 
communication markets during the past decade or more has progressed to the point 
that some analysts envisage future markets in which entry occurs in all segments (i.e. 
networks and services).  For example, in principle, international communication 
traffic originating on a network owned by operator A in country X could be 
terminated in country Y on operator A's network or on a network owned by another 
operator in country Y.  Such traffic might be routed through a network in country Z 
owned by operator A, B or C on the way to its destination.  The traffic itself might be 
processed by operator A, B, C, or D as value is added to information content by 
service providers.  The organisation and administration of billing, maintenance, 
security, and management could be integrated with the provision of service by 
operator A in the originating country, or it could be handled by any one of a number 
of other parties. 
 
In this type of market, the theoretical number of potential owners/operators of the 
network and service components which handle communication traffic could rise 
    4exponentially.  The share of traffic and revenues accruing to any single supplier 
would reflect its technical superiority, the variety and quality of its services, and the 
efficiency of its operation.  The characteristics of the ‘network of networks’ would be 
neutral as to cost and revenue advantage for any individual network or service 
operator - and it would be neutral from the perspective of users, both large and small.   
 
The failure to reap the benefits of this model generally is ascribed to the transitional 
problems of an unevenly liberalising communication marketplace.  Suppliers point to 
the recalcitrance of monopoly or dominant network infrastructure operators in 
national markets as a major reason for their failure to meet efficiency, diversity and 
quality of service objectives.   
 
The assumption is, however, that competitive entry will resolve inefficiencies and 
distortions of supply.  Competition is expected to ensure that the provisioning of 
voice, data, and image services is based upon the optimisation of the economic and 
technical characteristics of networks in response to user requirements.  The 
transmission, switching and information processing components of communication 
networks in this model effectively become commodities in the marketplace.  These 
commodities could be mixed and matched according to user specifications and 
preferences.  In the full competition model envisaged by some analysts, 
communication network and service suppliers would compete on the basis of price 
and quality differentiation.  Their success or failure would reflect their business 
acumen and ability to maximise their competencies through a careful balancing of 
competition and collaboration with suppliers of different network commodities.  
Table 1 shows the predominant characteristics of this model. 
 
--------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------- 
 
In some cases, end-to-end ownership and management of infrastructure facilities 
would provide an attractive route to competitive success.  In others, end-to-end 
infrastructure supply might be coupled with the outsourcing of other requirements to 
third parties. Competition in this model implies the eventual commodification of all 
aspects of network and service supply.  In this event, no special features of 
technology or the market would call for sector-specific national policies or 
regulations.  The market would create strong incentives for the creation of generic 
intelligent network platforms, open access for all service suppliers and end users, and 
for the gradual ‘withering away’ of the formal institutions of public intervention via 
regulation. 
 
No single supplier would have superior competence in the production of the 
commodities required to provide the range of services needed by any single large (or 
small) customer. In this model, there is nothing special about communication network 
or service supply which distinguishes it from any other industry sector.  The market 
would provide the signals necessary to ensure the development of innovative, 
accessible and affordable services.  
 
    5This model would prevail, however, only in a market in which there was uniformity 
within and across national markets, that is, open competition in all aspects of the 
communication supply market.  Even the strongest advocates of open entry in national 
communication markets do not expect this situation to prevail for several decades 
(Mansell and Credé 1995).  The absence of the conditions needed to fulfil the 
assumptions of the full competition model is not attributable merely to a failure of 
political will on the part of governments.  Liberalisation of communication markets 
can bring some benefits but it also brings disadvantages.  These are associated with 
the continuing process of the monopolisation of markets, increasing co-ordination 
costs, and the exclusionary impact of networks that fail to achieve the conditions 
assumed by the full competition model (Mansell 1993).  If communication markets 
are unlikely to evolve - because of their special characteristics - into fully competitive 
commodity-like markets,
 what model can serve as a more effective guide to public 
policy? 
 
3.2  A Strategic Evolutionary Model 
 
The characteristics of communication markets in countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States where substantial market liberalisation has been 
introduced have the attributes of a strategic evolutionary model (Mansell 1993).  The 
co-evolution of markets and technologies in the face of competition and other market 
liberalising measures is characterised by the following features:  1) proprietary 
network interface standards are maintained in key segments of the public network 
infrastructure; 2) there is resistance by dominant suppliers to requests that they 
unbundle network resources (software functionality) and introduce transparent costing 
methodologies; 3) there are superficial variations in equipment and network design in 
some submarkets, cross-subsidies are used when they are likely to go undetected, and 
price and quality differentiation are introduced only in submarkets where competition 
is strongest; 4) service competition including maintenance, billing, use of network 
resources and service applications is weak in most submarkets and strong generally 
only where the majority of customers are large globally operating multinational firms; 
and 5) uneven network and service access conditions are perpetuated as a result of 
uneven geographically distributed access, varying restrictions on the use of public 
network resources, price discrimination based on unjustified volume discounts and 
difficult negotiations over network interconnection. 
 
These characteristics are summarised in Table 2. 
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
In spite of the rhetoric which characterises advocacy of the benefits of the full 
competition model, many of the new entrants to communication markets do not 
welcome completely unregulated markets.  On the contrary, once they enter the 
market they regard further market liberalisation as inappropriate in the light of their 
commercial interests.  In most cases, new entrants do not seek to, nor would they be 
able to, match the scope and coverage of existing domestic public telecommunication 
operators in terms of the extent of market penetration. 
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The full competition model depends for its validity on the assumption that 
competition is principally price-based and products are relatively undifferentiated.  
Under such conditions buyers would be able to assess differences in prices and 
respond accordingly.  The interests of sellers and customers would be served best by 
the withdrawal of regulations and by maximising the opportunities for open entry.  
However, most entrants to the new communication supply market aim to achieve a 
viable position on the basis of niche market service provision.  This is akin to the type 
of competition which exists in a franchise market.
2  All the western economies have 
enforceable laws which prevent imitation which undercuts an existing competitor 
unless a licence has first been agreed by the owner of a franchise allowing the name, 
procedures, etc., to be used.  In order to meet the requirements of various franchise 
contractual terms, it is necessary for products to be differentiated in a number of 
different ways.  The greater the similarity or 'passing off', the higher the likelihood of 
legal action. 
 
In the strategic evolutionary model, communication suppliers or ‘franchisees’ do not 
‘compete’ in the provision of their networks and services.  Instead, suppliers are 
explicitly constrained from entering into some areas of the market.  In the 
communication market of the 1990s, it is increasingly appropriate to use the franchise 
metaphor.  For example, when foreign investors such as NYNEX or US West are 
granted a cable/telephony franchise in Britain, they are effectively being given rights 
analogous to a ‘franchise’ to offer a special type of service which did not previously 
exist.  Similarly, when new entrants to local exchange markets are given licences 
which permit them to install fibre optic cable in the City of London, they are granted a 
form of ‘franchise’ which allows them to offer a specific type of service. 
 
The franchise metaphor clarifies the apparent paradox whereby new entrants seek to 
retain regulation while they pay lip service to the full competition model - their main 
concern is protection of their respective ‘franchises’.  Suppliers in the new 
communication market of the 1990s negotiate the terms and conditions of regulation 
in the light of their long (or short) term economic and strategic objectives.  For 
example, a study of the United Kingdom market which has experienced considerable 
liberalisation since the mid-1980s,
3  shows that resistance to full market liberalisation 
(although frequently not in terms of overt corporate policy) is commonplace (Mansell 
and Credé 1995).  At the time of the study in 1994, the only company to favour 
complete liberalisation was the incumbent network operator, British Telecom.
4   The 
other entrants to the network and service market justified their resistance to 
completely open markets on the basis of their need for: 
 
•  Regulatory Stability:  New entrants favoured a stable regulatory environment as 
opposed to elimination of all licence restrictions and regulatory controls. 
   
•  Voluntary Market Segmentation:  New entrants selected a particular market 
segment in which to compete.  Removal of regulatory constraints was unlikely to 
stimulate further investment. 
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exclusive or semi-exclusive franchises similar in nature to those awarded to cable 
franchisees. 
   
•  Strategic Market Entry Incentives:  New entry was based on strategic 
considerations rather than primarily on financial factors. 
   
•  Regulation and Investment:  New entrants openly sought the protection of the 
regulatory regime to ensure that the long-term payback of investments could be 
achieved. 
   
•  Emphasis on Service Provision: Although most entrants planned to construct new 
infrastructure, success was dependent on a company abilities to differentiate by 
higher quality and unique service provision. 
 
Although the structuring of the new communication markets is clearly a reflection of 
the economic interests of both dominant and niche market players, the strategic 
evolutionary model draws attention to areas in which ‘public interest’ considerations 
such as universal public services, privacy protection, etc., can become embedded in 
the ‘franchises’ awarded to new entrants as they enter the market.  Licence conditions 
can be used to establish conditions that give weight to the interests of individual 
consumers in areas were these are unlikely to coincide with those of suppliers and 
large customers.  
 
The strategic evolutionary model draws attention to the necessary and continuing role 
of policy and regulation.  Constraining the market power of dominant operators where 
their activities are anti-competitive or exclusionary; and creating incentives for new 
market entry when market liberalisation begins are conventionally recognised roles 
for policy and regulation in the telecommunication sector.  A third role, however, 
needs to be emphasised and developed in the new communication supply market.  
This is to ensure co-ordination in the supply of complex communication systems via 
the terms and conditions of licensing or ‘franchise’ agreements.  This role is needed in 
response to the complexity of new network and service environments, and to the need 
to build social and economic objectives explicitly into the operational conditions 
(technical and organisational) that govern entry and participation in the market. 
 
The amount of competitive activity that has emerged thus far in the United States and 
in European countries is insignificant as compared to the potential for new entry in 
the communication supply market (Selwyn et al. 1993).  However, as Selwyn et al. 
argue, even the presence of a significant amount of new entry would not be evidence 
of a long term trend toward effective, much less, full competition in the marketplace. 
‘As such, the presence of individual competitors does not result in 'competition' in a 
meaningful economic sense.  More importantly, while the entry of new firms may 
ultimately rewrite the list of major industry players..., by itself it does not assure the 
long-run creation of market competition’ (Selwyn et al. 1993: 7-8). 
 
It may be argued that the new communication markets of the 1990s are becoming 
subject to the forces of global competition or rivalry and that they are therefore 
beyond the control of the policy and regulatory apparatus of many states.  However, 
    8since communication traffic ultimately originates and terminates within the 
boundaries of what we understand as the nation state it is reasonable to seek ways to 
ensure that the policy and regulatory apparatus is used to shape the design of national 
markets in the interests of social and economic goals that are more broadly defined 
than those of major supplier and user stakeholders. 
 
4.0  Policy and Regulatory:  The Co-Evolution of Technologies and Markets 
 
The co-evolution of markets and communication and information technologies raises 
issues about both the technical design and architectures of networks and the design of 
policies and regulations.  These include the sustainability of competition, the 
prospects of stakeholders in global markets (as well as their national home markets) 
and their capabilities to generate continuous innovation.  How will the pieces of the 
puzzle - dynamic and sustainable technological innovation and competitiveness in 
national and international markets - fit together?  Indeed, how will these pieces of the 
puzzle fit together with social policy issues? 
 
Governments are being exhorted by private sector stakeholders to put the conditions 
in place to stimulate innovation and to allow competition to flourish.  On the one 
hand, they argue the need to dislodge the traditional monopoly players.  On the other, 
however, there is the need to ensure that competition does not erode resources for 
innovation and social and economic experimentation.  The fact that these issues are 
interlinked is recognised at the level of policy rhetoric and exhortation.  We find, for 
example, numerous references to the information ‘poor’ and the information ‘rich’ in 
the formal rhetoric of policy documents on national and global information 
infrastructures (Group of Prominent Persons, 1994; Gore 1995).  
 Nevertheless, there 
is a missing element in the puzzle.  This is the absence of a consensus on how to bring 
about the innovations in policy and regulation that are needed in the face of market 
liberalisation. 
 
Changes in policy or regulation that affect the technical design of networks invariably 
are uncoupled from those changes in policy that affect the long term structure of 
markets and the process of competition (costs, prices, etc.).  Studies of technical 
change and innovation have yielded useful insights in this context.  Market failure and 
tendencies toward monopolistic or oligopolistic markets are not inherently bad; they 
are the very essence of the stimulus to innovation (Metcalfe 1993).  However, policies 
and regulations addressed to issues of market failure need to be coupled directly with 
those aimed at stimulating the innovative capabilities and the creativity of existing 
and new supplier stakeholders as well as the many smaller businesses and consumers.   
 
The missing element in the ‘information highway’ evolutionary puzzle is a focus on 
the creation of policy and regulatory institutions that can address innovation, 
competition and social policy issues together.  Historical and current experience show 
that the conditions under which interconnection of networks is achieved are central to 
the ways markets evolve (Arnbak et al. 1994).  To achieve, what Noam (1994) has 
called a ‘system of systems’, policy makers will need to take responsibility for 
creating new incentives in the marketplace.  New institutions of policy and regulation 
will be needed to ensure both that anti-competitive practices are curtailed and that 
actions are taken to stimulate the creativity of suppliers and users.
5
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The interconnection issue can provide a focus for creative institution building on a 
national (or regional basis).  Incentives for investment, the wider geographical 
distribution, accessibility and affordability of services, and for specialised and other 
services to meet social and regional requirements could be addressed via the creative 
use of interconnection policies and practices.  Creative policies and practices along 
these lines will require that political resources be focused on this issue as a matter of 
the highest priority.   It will also bring fears of the rise of a labyrinthine centralised 
regulatory apparatus.  These fears can be countered by showing that a concentration 
of resources in this area could reduce the need for other forms of regulation that are 
proving increasingly ineffective in a market populated by many suppliers. 
 
Failure to engage public policy and regulatory resources in this way may bring short 
term benefits for some of the stakeholders on the supply and user sides of the new 
communication market, but these benefits will be short-lived as markets continue to 
evolve.  David Ricardo suggested in 1810 that ‘where there is free competition, the 
interests of the individual and that of the community are never at variance’.  
Incontrovertible evidence that ‘information highway’ markets are not free exists, 
however, both because of the history of public policy measures and because of the 
need for non-market forms of co-ordination of complex networks.  As the co-
evolution of technologies and markets continues, the need for policy and regulatory 
innovations will continue too.  Policy and regulation will need to address three issues: 
constraining the market power of dominant operators; creating incentives for new 
market entry; and c) introducing innovative ways to respond to the need for technical 
and market co-ordination to achieve both social and economic goals. 
 
The predominant characteristics of policy and regulation that are emerging in the 
1990s are inadequate to ensure that information infrastructures will be accessible and 
affordable.  They will not maximise the potential for participation in the information 
society of the twenty-first century.  There is a need to focus scarce regulatory and 
policy resources in key areas of network and organisational design and this is not a 
sign of the withering away of regulation.  The strategic evolutionary model points to 
the fact that, increasing choice and diversity in services and downward pressure on 
some prices is complemented by cost increases associated with the need to recover 
co-ordination costs and by exclusionary tactics employed by suppliers as they engage 
in new market monopolisation strategies. 
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1.  These arguments are developed in Mansell and Silverstone (1995 
forthcoming). 
 
2.  Franchising has come to account for an increasingly large element of 
economic activity, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Franchising can be seen to apply equally to fast food (e.g. MacDonalds, 
Burger King and Pizza Hut) as to retailing (e.g. Benneton, Body Shop) and 
specialist services (e.g. Kwik-Fit Exhausts and Pronta-print). The ‘franchise’ 
metaphor is not new to telecommunications.  Charles Jonscher and others have 
argued a similar case with respect to early phases of liberalisation in the 
British market. 
 
3.  Interviews were conducted by Andreas Credé, Doctoral Candidate, Science 
Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, with 14 companies active in the 
United Kingdom communication market over the period 23 March - 4 May 
1994.  With the exception of BT and Mercury, all the companies were recent 
entrants to the market.  The selection of internationally owned infrastructure 
providers was drawn from the approximately 20 internationally owned 
companies active in the British market.  The survey was designed to achieve 
reasonable geographical and market segment coverage.  Views on the benefits 
and disadvantages of international competition in communication markets and 
the further liberalisation of national markets were obtained. 
 
 
4.  By January 1994, the Department of Trade and Industry in the United 
Kingdom had received 76 applications for new licenses and 35 had been 
issued.  Twelve cable television companies were providing telecommunication 
services and 23 new licenses had been granted.  The 12 companies offering 
services were mainly inward foreign investors. 
 
5.  This argument differs from Noam’s observations about the effects of network 
‘tipping’ as competition is introduced.  His argument seems to suggest that 
markets more closely approximate the conditions of the full competition 
model.  The strategic evolutionary model focuses more centrally on the 
articulation of new modes of monopolisation and their social and economic 
impact.  See Noam (1991). 
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Table 1:  Full Competition - Idealist - Model 
Permeable Seamless Networks 
Optimal Service Diffusion 
Demand-led Industry 
Open Systems, Common Interface Standards 






Table 2: A Strategic Evolutionary Model 
Fragmented Networks 
Uneven (non-universal) Service Diffusion 
Multinational User Pressure on Network and Service Design 
Uneven Competition in Submarkets 
Absence of Transparent Cost/Price Relationships for Network Access and Use 
Increasing Regulation 
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